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I. INTRODUCTION
State public utility commissions play an enormous role in the
regulation of different industries that have subtle but substantial
effects on the daily lives of consumers—which includes citizens who
uses these services, that is to say nearly everyone in the United
States.1 Regulated industries, generally referred to as investor owned
utilities,2 include gas, electric, or water providers, regional
telecommunication, and railroad companies.3 Some jurisdictions may
also regulate regional light rail transportation, buses, automated
vehicles, or ride hailing services. 4
Many public utility commissions were originally created to
regulate railroad companies.5 However, during the transition to the
modern era their reach was greatly expanded to encompass the host of
now regulated public industries.6 In more recent times, the role of the
*

E. Nathan Cheung. J.D. Candidate 2020, Pepperdine University School of
Law. Thanks to Christopher Campbell and Yoori Chung for their guidance, advice,
and criticism of prior drafts. Special thanks to Professor Gregory Ogden for our
conversations on administrative and regulatory law during my time as his student
and member of this journal. I am also deeply indebted to Lauren Jacobs and Rachel
Zarrabi for their excellent edits and thoughtful comments. All errors or omissions
in this paper are solely my own.
1
New Database Provides a Window into Public Utility Commissions in All 50
U.S. States, PR NEWSWIRE (Sept. 18, 2019), https://perma.cc/9HQV-RALK.
2
Also known as publicly owned utilities because they are owned by members
of the public, namely investors. See generally Differences Between Publicly and
Investor-Owned Utilities, CAL. ENERGY COMM’N,
https://ww2.energy.ca.gov/pou_reporting/background/difference_pou_iou.html (last
visited Apr. 10, 2020).
3
See, e.g., Utilities and Industries, CAL. PUB. UTIL. COMM’N,
https://www.cpuc.ca.gov/UtilitiesIndustries/
(last visited Feb. 4, 2020); Introduction, HAW. PUB. UTIL. COMM’N,
http://puc.hawaii.gov/about/introduction/ (last visited Feb. 4, 2020); About the
DPU, MASS. DEP’T OF PUB. UTIL., https://www.mass.gov/about-the-dpu (last
visited Feb. 4, 2020); About the PUCT, PUB. UTIL. COMM’N OF TEX.,
https://www.puc.texas.gov/agency/about/mission.aspx (last visited Feb. 4, 2020).
4
See generally Javier Campos & Pedro Cantos, Rail Transport Regulation,
ECON. DEV. INSTITUTE OF THE WORLD BANK,
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/284281468764045820/135535322_200
41117180643/additional/multi-page.pdf (last visited Apr. 10, 2020); Truck and Bus
Regulation Compliance Requirement Overview, CAL. AIR RES. BD.,
https://ww3.arb.ca.gov/msprog/onrdiesel/documents/fsregsum.pdf (last updated
June 18, 2019); Autonomous Vehicles | Self-Driving Vehicles Enacted Legislation,
NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES (Feb. 18, 2020),
https://www.ncsl.org/research/transportation/autonomous-vehicles-self-drivingvehicles-enacted-legislation.aspx.
5
See PUB. UTIL. COMM’N OF TEX., supra note 3.
6
See PUB. UTIL. COMM’N OF TEX., supra note 3.
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public utility commission has further expanded beyond regulation of
specific industries to become tools to implement various policy goals
and attitudes towards respective industries. 7
Part II of this paper will seek to address different issues that may
be encountered by the modern public utility commission.8 Part II
provides a brief description of the regulatory framework that serves as
an epistemic rationale for public utility commissions.9 Further, Part II
provides a description of the broad statutory and implicit powers of
public utility commissions.10
Part III of this paper seeks to present the concept of incentive
regulation, which beyond its common support in economic theory,
also has a basis in moral theory.11 Notable among these is the
Aristotelian concept of akrasia,12 which serves both as a guiding
principle for the tendencies of individual corporate behavior and a
rationale for regulating behavior.13 Additionally, Part III introduces
the Humean idea of motivation,14 which provides the principle for
regulation based on incentivizing and rewarding behavior. 15 Part III
also considers a sociological approach of punishment based on
disincentivizing certain behavior by placing public spotlight on
actions deemed immoral.16
Lastly, Part IV seeks to analyze incentive regulation applied to the
California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC).17 The purpose of the
analysis is both to prescribe the applicability of incentive regulation,
and also assign potential challenges with this approach. Part IV
outlines the unique, specific authority of the CPUC as a

7

Engagement Between Public Utility Commissions and State Legislatures,
NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES,
https://www.ncsl.org/research/energy/engagement-between-public-utilitycommissions-and-state-legislatures.aspx (last visited Feb. 4, 2020).
8
See infra Part II.
9
See infra id.
10
See infra id. Most of this authority stems from the state and may be
independent from federal law. Id.
11
See infra Part III.
12
See Aristotle, infra note 46.
13
See id.; infra Part II.
14
See Smith, infra note 62.
15
See id.
16
See infra Part III.
17
See infra Part IV. This article discusses the California Public Utilities
Commission because it is historically one of the largest and best staffed
commissions, while overseeing one of the largest states in the nation. See, e.g.,
CPUC History & Organizational Structure, CAL. PUB. UTIL. COMM’N,
https://www.cpuc.ca.gov/history/ (last visited Apr. 10, 2020).
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constitutionally enabled regulatory body. 18 It also identifies areas
where incentive regulation is readily applicable at the CPUC, where it
has already applied, and how it could supplement its current
regulatory scheme.19 Part IV ends with a discussion of unique
challenges the CPUC faces with incentive regulation.20
II. THE MODERN PUBLIC UTILITY COMMISSION
In the nineteenth century, many states began forming their own
respective precursor to the modern public utility commission to
regulate railroads.21 Early on, the powers of these commissions were
fairly limited.22 It was not until years later that legislation provided
additional powers to regulate electricity and natural gas. 23 It is within
the authority of public utility commissions to regulate rates of those
utilities that much of its modern authority stems.24
A. Public Utility Commissions
State statutes organize many types of public utility commission.25
Often, either public citizens or a state governor appoints the
commissioners who comprise a commission.26 Depending on the
state’s resources, a public utility commission may be quite large and
include several specialized departments staffed by experts in each
specific industry.27
The precursor to public utility commissions were commissions
that regulated the railroad industry.28 Later, as electricity and gas
power became prominent aspects of modern life, states enacted
legislation expanding the regulatory authority of these industries to

18

CAL. CONST. art. XII, § 2. Contra MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 25 § 1 (2020); TEX.
UTIL. CODE § 11.002(c) (2017).
19
See infra Part IV.
20
See id.
21
I. Leo Sharfman, Commission Regulation of Public Utilities: A Survey of
Legislation, 53 THE ANNALS OF THE AM. ACAD. OF POL. & SOC. SCI., 1, 1-18
(1914); see also Scott, infra note 29, at 378.
22
Sharfman, supra note 21, at 1.
23
Id.; see also Scott, infra note 29, at 378.
24
Sharfman, supra note 21, at 16.
25
Id.
26
Id.
27
For links to department organization charts, see About the California Public
Utilities Commission (CPUC), CAL. PUB. UTIL. COMM’N,
https://www.cpuc.ca.gov/aboutus/ (last visited Feb. 4, 2020); Department of Public
Utilities (DPU), MASS. DEP’T OF PUB. UTIL., https://www.mass.gov/ (last visited
Feb. 4, 2020); see also ICC Offices and Bureaus, ILL. COMM. COMM’N,
https://www.icc.illinois.gov/about/offices (last visited Feb. 4, 2020).
28
Supra note 3.
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public utility commissions.29 Since that time, the original power of
railroads has declined and public utility commissions have shifted
greater focus towards energy regulation.30
B. The Broad Reach and Authority of Public Utility Commissions
While the respective authority of public utility commissions may
vary based on state legislation, most public utility commissions are
endowed with authority to regulate rates that are “just and
reasonable.”31 This provides each state commission discretion to
determine the rates of each state utility within its jurisdiction.32
Additionally, each commission is typically granted authority to
generate its own procedural rules.33
This regulation of utilities has often been referred to as a
regulatory compact between state commissions and regulated
industries.34 Because many of these regulated industries had
monopolies over their service areas, government regulation
substituted for the absence of general competition. 35 Under this
scheme, public utility commissions serve “a multi-faceted purpose:
(1) to ensure that customers ha[ve] access to safe, reliable service; (2)
to prevent discrimination against certain classes of customers; and (3)
to ensure that the cost for service rendered under monopoly
conditions remain[s] reasonable.”36
By setting rates, the commissions have the authority to determine
the profits of a regulated utility.37 Conversely, rate setting also
affects the service cost and citizen’s living standards within the
state.38 Traditionally, ratemaking has focused on the balance between
investor and consumer interests.39 “The return to the equity owner
should be commensurate with returns on investments in other
29

Inara Scott, Teaching an Old Dog New Tricks: Adapting Public Utility
Commissions to Meet Twenty-First Century Climate Challenges, 38 HARV.
ENVTL. L. REV. 371, 378 (2014).
30
Id.
31
See, e.g., CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 451 (2019); FLA. STAT. § 366.041(1)
(2019).
32
Sharfman, supra note 21, at 7.
33
Id. at 9.
34
See, e.g., Jonas J. Monast & Sarah K. Adair, Completing the Energy
Innovation Cycle: The View from the Public Utility Commission, 65 HASTINGS
L. J. 1345, 1356 (2014).
35
Scott, supra note 29, at 385.
36
Id.
37
Monast & Adair, supra note 34, at 1356.
38
Id.
39
Scott, supra note 29, at 381; see also Monast & Adair, supra note 34, at
135.
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enterprises having corresponding risks. That return, moreover,
should be sufficient to assure confidence in the financial integrity of
the enterprise, so as to maintain its credit and to attract capital.” 40
However, in recent years, rate setting has expanded to encompass
approval of utility projects by its state’s public utility commission.41
Under the authority of ratemaking, a commission has authority over a
utility’s ability to make significant new investments.42 While a
commission generally does not have independent power to mandate
utility construction of new sites, the state legislature may delegate the
power to the public utility commission.43 Thus, through its delegated
authority, a commission may regulate various qualities of site
construction and the subsequent rate effect of those projects. 44
II. PHILOSOPHICAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR REGULATION
With the advent of greater tools, a commission may consider
adopting new policies and different concepts to regulate industries. 45
industries.45 This section will consider several different philosophical
philosophical concepts for guidance in assessing the behavior of a
utility.
A. Akrasia: Wrong Action Without Knowledge
Concerns about the actual motivation may arise when attempting
to discern a utility’s moral judgments about their action. It might be
simplistic to assume that every action is based on the utility’s moral
judgment. Thus, when an actor act badly, it may be an instance
where although she arrived through moral reasoning to a correct
moral judgment, she nonetheless volitionally decided not to act upon
it. Thus, she may decide to act contrary to what she reasoned to be
good, and instead act otherwise.46 This then is contrary to the Plato’s
idea in Protagoras, more like the opposite view of what Aristotle calls
akrasia, or weakness of the will.47 In this way, the akratic individual
40

Scott, supra note 29, at 381.
Id. at 394.
42
Id.; see also William Boyd & Ann E. Carlson, Accidents of Federalism:
Ratemaking and Policy Innovation in Public Utility Law, 63 UCLA L. REV. 810
(2016).
43
Scott, supra note 29, at 393; see also Monast & Adair, supra note 34, at
1356.
44
Scott, supra note 29, at 394.
45
See, e.g., Herman K. Trabish, 3 state commissions upending the way utilities
do business, UTILITYDIVE (Oct. 2, 2019), utilitydive.com/news/3-statecommissions-upending-the-way-utilities-do-business/563949/.
46
See ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS bk. VII, at 105-27 (W.D. Ross trans.,
Batoche Books ed. 1999) (c. 384 B.C.E).
47
Id.
41
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is more akin to someone who reasoned poorly and came to a
conclusion that was wrong or immoral. 48 Rather the akratic
individual is someone who reasoned well and knows better, but
acted contrary to what they have reasoned well or good. 49 Thus,
arises the problem of what should be done to resolve this
to act well despite moral reasoning otherwise.
Inversely, it is not unimaginable that regulators occasionally fail
to act well through their regulation. This may stem from deficiencies
in information or resources. 50 Such deficiencies could severely limit
a commission to only identify especially bad utility action, while
unknowingly permitting numerous other to persist.51
B. Motivation: Causation for Moral Action
Hume’s theory of motivation (Humean theory) seeks to
the effect of moral judgments on actions.52 One of the principles
behind the Humean theory is that moral judgments connect to
motivation.53 Moral judgments refer to conclusions based on all
the information the actor possesses, which is translated into a
decision as the best or worst action that the actor might take.54
Although moral judgments may be considered subjective, the
resulting actions are not because the tangible real-world
consequences always exist.55 The premise behind the Humean
theory is a nexus between the cognitive state of belief and
motivation.56 Thus, where one’s moral judgments affect and
enlighten their actions, and what one adjudges to be moral or right
should motivate them to action.57
Here, the Humean theory seems to echo the Platonic idea that
no man acts contrary to what they believe is good, even if his
48

Id.
Aristotle’s Ethics, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL.,
https://perma.cc/SQS2-LYHJ (last updated June 15, 2018).
50
Paul L. Joskow & Richard Schmalensee, Incentive Regulation for
Electric Utilities, 4 YALE J. ON REG., 1, 12 (1986).
51
Id.
52
Moral Motivation, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL. (Sep. 18, 2019),
https://perma.cc/PSA7-4Q98.
53
Id.
54
See Steve Guglielmo, Moral judgment as information processing; an
integrative review, 6 FRONTIERS IN PSYCHOL. 1, 1-19 (Oct. 30, 2015),
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4626624/pdf/fpsyg-0601637.pdf. Put more simply, whether it is good or bad to perform a given
action. See, e.g., id. at 1.
55
See, e.g., id. at 1-19.
56
Moral Motivation, supra note 52.
57
Id.
49
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good is considered wrong by all others.58 In this way, no individual
deliberately acts wrongly while at the same time maintaining the
understanding he is acting wrongly.59 An individual that, in fact, is
acting wrongly will always do so with the belief his wrong action is
good. Thus, in the context of Hume’s theory, one’s moral judgment
(i.e. what the individual believes to be morally right) always
translates and motivates their actions.60
In the context of a regulated utility’s behavior, there is often a
break between correct behavior and the bad behavior. Thus, one must
presume that no regulated utility deliberately acts in a way that
violates the regulator’s rules. Under the premise that no utility can
deliberately act wrongfully while in fact acting wrongly, the error
must lie in the utility’s actions. Thus, there must be some error in the
utility’s judgment in determining its actions, such as where an action
that is actually wrong, the actor believes it is good.
If the argument is that the utility’s error is the result of its own
poor moral behavior, something like a monetary fine would be
unsuccessful in remediating that error. Even if an actor is punished
for an action, the actor cannot reasonably change an action that it
intrinsically believes to be correct because this is what motivates the
action.
Thus, applied to the context of fines, there must be a better way to
correct the utility’s behavior besides merely fining them. A fine only
indicates to the utility that an action was contrary to the regulator’s
standard of good action. However, an indicator neither necessarily,
nor sufficiently corrects poor judgment leading to the bad behavior.61
Rather there must be some sort of re-education to repair the defective
moral judgments of the actor, i.e., a regulated utility.
Initially, it seems easy to reduce this to an assumption that
regulated utilities (or anything in the Humean theory) are based on
what some have called a “strong phenomenological conception” of
desires.62 Here, phenomenological conception refers to motivations
and desires like feelings—sequences that occur as a result of some
58

See PLATO, PROTAGORAS (Benjamin Jowett trans.) (c. 380 B.C.E),
http://classics.mit.edu//Plato/protagoras.html (last visited Apr. 11, 2020).
59
Id.
60
Moral Motivation, supra note 52.
61
See H.A. Prichard, Does Moral Philosophy Rest on a Mistake?, 21 MIND 21,
21-37 (1912) (noting that signifiers provide a description of a value, but provide no
insight toward the value itself).
62
Michael Smith, The Humean Theory of Motivation, 96 MIND 35, 45 (Jan.
1987) (defining that desires are, like sensations, simply and essentially states that
have a certain phenomenological content).
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random stimulus or desire for something. 63 However, although
motivations or desires may initially seem phenomenological, that
result for a subject’s fallibility in understanding one’s own
Rather, these desires are propositional and based on a series of
contributing factors or reasons.65 Thus, they are not the result of
spontaneous appearance of ideas despite however much an actor
might feel or believe their motivations are spontaneous.
C. Shame: An Imperfect Response to Wrong Action
One difficulty with the Humean theory is the possibility that
despite efforts to correct moral behavior, the actor still acts
Here, a regulated party might rather choose to take its chances and
risk greater penalties than to make additional strides toward selfreporting and self-auditing of compliance. Thus, the actor’s
moral judgment may remain unaltered despite attempts at
reeducation or conditioning to mend his behavior.
Nonetheless, if the utility deliberately acts wrongfully, there
conceivably must be another way to enforce correct moral
behavior. Thus, there exists the sociological approach of
somehow shining the spotlight on an agency or even shaming the
infringing utility for its bad behavior.
Throughout history, shaming a wrongdoer has been a staple of
human punishment.67 Shaming has ranged from public hangings
to criminals in the stocks.68 Applied to the context of a utility, it
stretches the imagination to find ways to shame a utility. Beyond
ostracizing the leadership of a utility for their poor decisionmaking, the apparent ways to shame a utility into correct behavior
are limited.69
However, taken in conjunction with other approaches
mentioned above, perhaps a form of hybrid shaming may be
appropriate. Regulators may seek to shame the utility by making
public: (1) the monetary fine inflicted on the utility public, (2)
past attempts of reeducating and fixing the utility’s poor moral
63

Id. at 46.
Id. at 47.
65
Id.
66
See, e.g., id. at 35-37.
67
See, e.g., David A. Skeel Jr., Shaming in Corporate Law, 149 UNIV. OF
PENN. LAW REV. 1811, 1811-68 (2001).
68
See Roger Hood, Capital punishment, ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA
(Apr. 6, 2020), https://www.britannica.com/topic/capital-punishment; ADAM
JAY HIRSH, THE RISE OF THE PENITENTIARY: PRISONS AND PUNISHMENT IN
EARLY AMERICA 5 (1992).
69
See, e.g., Skeel, supra note 67.
64

67
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judgment public,70 (3) and the attempts and steps taken to condition
the utility to act better public.71 While traditional forms of shaming
done for the sake of shaming (e.g., hanging or putting in the stocks) 72
may be unsuccessful, shaming that affects the utility’s reputation by
highlighting its indignation may be more successful in deterring poor
behavior.73
It may be presumed that when the utility’s continued bad behavior
behavior is “aired out,” it would change.74 When the utility’s bad
behavior is made public, it becomes a public image problem that the
the utility is more inclined to repair.75
However, the problem with shaming utilities and their leadership
leadership is that those liable are seldom held accountable.76
Corporate leadership frequently shifts, and decisionmakers
responsible for bad actions may be gone by the time the negative
effects are realized as severe violations.77 Thus, shaming runs the
risk of punishing the wrong actors, indeed, those who are not even the
actors responsible for the violations may be punished.78 Furthermore,
with corporate reshuffling, there is the possibility that those who were
responsible for establishing a culture of non-compliance might be
completely gone and liability may be difficult to trace to the
originators.79
Thus, if agency bad behavior is characterized as a public image
problem, an alternative would be to shine the spotlight on regulated
parties and presenting them to the public for accountability. 80 Indeed,
shaming would only aggravate and serve a certain sort of “justice”
without any promise of true societal benefit. 81 However, by seeking
to transfer some of the regulation to public opinion, the agency may
be caused to change their attitudes and policies. 82

70

Id.
Id.
72
See Hood, supra note 68; HIRSH, supra note 68.
73
See, e.g., Skeel, supra note 67.
74
Id.
75
Id.
76
Id.
77
See, e.g., ALISON E. WOODWARD, JERRY ELIG, & TOM R. BURNS, MUNICIPAL
ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND ENERGY POLICY: A FIVE NATION STUDY OF POLITICS,
INNOVATION AND SOCIAL CHANGE 1-266 (Routledge 2019) (1994).
78
See, e.g., Skeel, supra note 67.
79
Id.
80
Id.
81
Id.
82
Id.
71
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One method is deterrence-based enforcement. 83 Under this
method, the first strategy is a performance-based approach where
“[w]hat is being spotlighted is the performance of government
institutions—and such an approach ties in perfectly with the
mantra of accountability.”84
Second, similar to the first suggestion, increasing transparency
government by “promoting transparency, because it is a useful
policy tool to influence [compliance] related behavior for the
and because it is the ‘right thing to do’ in an open society, has
strong support in recent years.”85 Similar to the Humean idea that
there are correct moral judgments, 86 this approach furthers the
that if the regulator is unable to fully hold the regulated party
accountable, and the regulated party is unwilling to hold itself
accountable,87 then the public might hold the regulated party
accountable.
This may be manifest through the agency reporting on the
accomplishments of respective regulated parties. For example, a
report on the industry leaders in compliance among a subset of
utilities or providing statistics of fulfilled incentive goals.
Furthermore, such a report may contain information about a
regulated party’s statistics of self-reporting and subsequent
compliance. Thus, this would provide transparency on how the
utility is regulated and how they have been interacting with the
respective agency. Furthermore, this would provide the public
with insight into how commissions function and how they
regulate utilities.88 Thus, when the regulator is transparent about
the progress—or lack of progress through omission or deficiency
in reporting—of industries, it may inspire change among similar
actors in the same regulated industry.
Notably, the commission may include a policy of granting
interested third parties standing to represent consumer interests in
its proceedings.89 These intervenors, notable in energy, 90 are

83

David L. Markell, The Role of Deterrence-Based Enforcement in a
“Reinvented” State/Federal Relationship: The Divide Between Theory and Reality,
24 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 100 (2000).
84
Id.
85
Id.
86
Smith, supra note 62.
87
Id. Forms of this might include self-reporting or demonstrated good
faith efforts towards compliance. See Markell, supra note 83.
88
Markell, supra note 83.
89
Intervenor Compensation Program, CAL. PUB. UTIL. COMM’N,
http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/icomp/ (last visited Feb. 9, 2019).
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usually fully staffed organizations comprised of specialists in the field
such as attorneys and experts capable of representing consumer
interests.91
However, this is not to presume that the intervenors alone would
would be sufficient. Although these groups are organized, they fit
within a very specific category and are not systematically available
available and participatory in every realm that a public utility
commission regulates.92 Furthermore, these groups are not always
always focused on compliance, but generally only on certain policy
policy goals like the bottom-line and the effect of ratepayers. 93 Thus,
Thus, their advocacy may include a specific bias to specific types of
of administrative proceedings, with a specific intent for specific
outcomes.
Lastly, Professor Markell suggests using the internet as a vehicle
vehicle for disseminating information.94 The internet “continue[s] to
to refine and enhance its . . . for public disclosure and dialogue in the
future.”95 Since Professor Markell published his article in 2000, the
internet capabilities have expanded. 96 The turn of the second
millennium was the time of dial-up, where a landline phone
connection was needed to connect to the internet. 97 Now, a mobile
phone is the medium for accessing the internet. 98 Certainly, since
2000 the internet has become a powerful and influential vehicle for
influencing public interest and disseminating information. 99

90

See Understanding Third-Party Ownership Financing, U.S. ENVTL.
PROTECTION AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/repowertoolbox/understanding-thirdparty-ownership-financing-structures-renewable-energy (last visited Apr. 13, 2020).
91
Intervenor Compensation Program, supra note 89.
92
See, e.g., Understanding Third Party Ownership Financing, supra note 90.
93
See, e.g., About Us, THE UTIL. REFORM NETWORK,
http://www.turn.org/about/ (last visited Feb 4, 2020); About UCAN, UTIL.
CONSUMERS’ ACTION NETWORK, https://www.ucan.org/who-is-ucan/ (last visited
Feb 4, 2020).
94
Markell, supra note 83, at 101.
95
Id.
96
See, e.g., Grichawat Lowatcharin & Charles E. Menifield, Determinants of
Internet-enabled Transparency at the Local Level: A Study of Midwestern County
Web Sites, 47 ST. & LOCAL GOV. REV., 102, 102-15 (2015).
97
See, e.g., Matthew Johnston, Smartphones Are Changing Advertising &
Marketing, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/articles/personalfinance/062315/how-smartphones-are-changing-advertising-marketing.asp (last
visited Feb. 4, 2020).
98
See, e.g., id.
99
See Lowatcharin & Menifield, supra note 96.
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Thus, applied here, the internet provides a powerful and
untapped resource for regulating industries. 100 Many public
utility commission websites publish proceedings, including
pending decisions, recent filings, and an archive of past decisions
agency rules.101 Furthermore, there are online forms that provide
a practitioner or complainant with access to administrative
remedies, these electronic filing systems allow potential
complainants to file complaints and initiate proceedings against
violating utilities.102 This plethora of access provides greater
access to the public to monitor and report violations.103 The
internet provides parties from across state jurisdiction to
participate in hearings and to have their voices and comments
heard at agency meetings.104 The internet allows interested
parties to live stream agency meetings and other hearings that are
open to the public.105 Thus, compared to the internet two decades
ago, there are more resources available for greater transparency.
However, public utility commission websites are not without
shortcomings. Many websites are difficult to navigate, with
redundant links and pages that are out of date.106 Although a
may find the required information to successfully launch
against a utility, the difficulty is finding and navigating the
reach the relevant information to ensure a successful complaint.107
Furthermore, litigant access may be hindered because of
confusion about proper administrative procedures. Whether a
litigant has standing to file a complaint or whether they know the
type of proceeding are to search for.108 These hindrances likely
affect the public’s ability to keep these industries accountable.
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See, e.g., Proceeding Information, CAL. PUB. UTIL. COMM’N,
https://www.cpuc.ca.gov/proceedings/ (last visited Feb. 4, 2020).
101
See, e.g., Filing a Complaint, CAL. PUB. UTIL. COMM’N,
https://www.cpuc.ca.gov/complaints/ (last visited Feb. 4, 2020); DPU
Consumer Information, MASS. DEP’T OF PUB. UTIL.,
https://www.mass.gov/dpu-consumer-information (last visited Feb. 4, 2020).
102
Id.
103
See, e.g., id.
104
Id.
105
See, e.g., Webcast Information, CAL. PUB. UTIL. COMM’N,
https://www.cpuc.ca.gov/General.aspx?id=1204 (last visited Feb. 4, 2020).
106
But see Public Utilities Commission, NEV. PUB. UTIL. COMM’N,
http://puc.nv.gov/#content (last accessed Apr. 13, 2020).
107
But see Utilities Complaint Form, ARIZ. CORP. COMM’N,
http://efiling.azcc.gov/online-services/utilities-complaint-external (last accessed
Apr. 13, 2020).
108
See, e.g., Filing a Complaint, supra note 101.
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Thus, the problem is not a lack of resources and opportunity, but
an excess of them.109 Perhaps the next step in increasing the public’s
ability to help regulate utilities is to present and reform commission
websites and other data accessible on the internet.
D. Incentive Reporting: Morality Based on Economic Efficiency
Instead of relying on utilities to altruistically act well based on
their moral judgment, an alternative may be to “provide positive
incentives for the regulated community to examine what it’s doing,
doing, see if there are problems, and correct them.”110 This policy
first implemented by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA),
(EPA), allows regulated parties to self-report any violations. 111 By
By self-reporting any violation, the potential fine for that violation
would be reduced based on the agency’s discretion.112 Similarly, a
a commission may attempt to adopt a similar methodology for selfself-reporting where regulated industries could directly report its own
own violation to the commission to enjoy a reduction on potential
fines for those violations.
This self-reporting serves two benefits. First, this alleviates some
some of the burden on the agency to review every detail of the
industry’s compliance status—something that is infeasible due to the
administrative limits of a commission and the vastness of data to
review.113 Second, this would hopefully create a culture of selfregulation among utilities.
While the EPA program only provides a reduction of fines for
self-reporting,114 self-reporting among regulated utilities would affect
the utility’s record in the case of severe issues of non-compliance. 115
Such a policy would not require a complete elimination of fines,
rather it would complement fines by providing an opportunity for
regulated parties to take steps as insurance against more severe fines

109
But see Guide to Handling Complaints about Your Regulated Utility
Service, N.Y. DEP’T OF PUB. SERV.,
https://www3.dps.ny.gov/W/PSCWeb.nsf/ArticlesByTitle/E14FA4E402578324852
5782C006979E8?OpenDocument (last accessed Apr. 13, 2020).
110
Markell, supra note 83, at 15.
111
Id. at 16.
112
Id.
113
Id. at 104.
114
Id. at 16.
115
See, e.g., Compliance Record Review Document, KY. DEP’T OF EDUC., 3-4
(June 2018),
https://education.ky.gov/specialed/excep/forms/Documents/Compliance_Record_R
eview_Document_2018.pdf.
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in the future.116 Indeed, such a system carries risks that parties
will attempt to “game” the system by building enough credit to
avert catastrophic fines during extraordinary events.117 Such a
risk may arguably outweigh the significant benefit of better
compliance and reporting.
However, this reporting system may still fail if the incentives
insufficiently encourage self-reporting. Where the benefits from
reporting do not outweigh the sanctions from the bad action, there
no reason for a utility to expend resources to self-report and
existing violations.
Furthermore, it may be significantly
disadvantageous for the bad actor to self-report when the
for the issue are worse than any benefit derived from reporting a
problem; had they rolled the dice and let it remain undetected,
may have been better off still.118
With this framework, one is in a position to assess and analyze
what a commission can seek to do to encourage utilities to act rightly.
What can be done to resolve the discord in akratic behavior of the
utilities to encourage the utility to act according to what they have
deliberated and concluded to be the morally right action. 119 In a
sense, how can the regulator promote virtuous behavior by the
regulated industry?
What immediately seems best is an incentive program. Similar to
an incentive system,120 it seems that one of the best ways to
encourage good behavior is to make that behavior more desirable.121
Indeed, there is a framework for creating incentives for self-reporting,
for creating benefits for those who self-report, and stricter penalties
for those who do not catch errors. 122 While this approach might seem
attractive, it is probably not the best approach.
There is the initial problem of administrating such a program.
There are numerous concerns of line drawing, of placing a benefit
possibly in the form of reduced penalty for any given standard for

116

See, e.g., Designed to Fail: Why Regulatory Agencies Don’t Work,
INDEP. SCI. NEWS, https://www.independentsciencenews.org/health/designedto-fail-why-regulatory-agencies-dont-work/ (last visited Feb. 4, 2020).
117
See, e.g., id.
118
Skeel, supra note 67.
119
See supra Part II.A.
120
Markell, supra note 83.
121
See infra Part IV.
122
See, e.g., NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH, ECONOMIC
REGULATION AND ITS REFORM: WHAT HAVE WE LEARNED? 291-344 (Nancy L.
Rose ed.) (2014); Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Optimal Law Enforcement with SelfReporting of Behavior, 102 J. OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 583, 583-606 (1994).
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reporting.123 In this way, any benefit ascribed to a certain reported
violation would create a currency of discounts for bad action and the
reporting of that action.124 A discount system, while laced with good
intentions, is at risk of being gamed by regulated industries.125 They
may choose to report only certain infractions to curry favor, while
even generating fabricated situations to gain a specific benefit.126 In
this way, infraction and reporting would be factored and integrated
into a corporate structure of what the regulated industry does and how
business is performed.
A more immediate concern also arises when the incentive system
fails to actually encourage good behavior. 127 Indeed, while it may be
well-intentioned to attempt an innovative, alternative framework for
encouraging good behavior, it would be foolish and inefficient to
move directly into a new regulation when it would clearly not work.
Thus, it would be pointless to even attempt to integrate an unproven
incentive system if the benefits are clearly not beneficial or enticing
enough to dissuade a regulated industry’s bad behavior.
Furthermore, an incentives system may be likened to some kind
of rewards system. Rewards are generally helpful to encourage
certain behavior.128 In a way this is the carrot and stick problem,
where sometime holding a carrot (encouragement) is more helpful to
getting the benefit.129 However, that is not the case here.130 It seems
superfluous for the regulator to create its own rewards system on top
of the existing corporate, capitalistic rewards system where the
regulated industry exists.131 It would further seem superfluous for
creating a rewards system for obeying the law.132
123

See, e.g., NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH, supra note 122, at
306-09.
124
See supra Part II.A.
125
See, e.g., Designed to Fail: Why Regulatory Agencies Don’t Work, supra
note 116.
126
See, e.g., id.
127
Markell, supra note 83.
128
See, e.g., Robert Bruce, Regulation: Carrot or Stick?, FIN. TIMES,
https://www.ft.com/content/3dae4b96-77eb-11dc-8e4c-0000779fd2ac (last visited
Feb. 4, 2020).
129
Id.
130
See, e.g., Pamela H. Bucy, “Carrot and Stick”: Post-Enron Regulatory
Initiatives, 8 BUFFALO CRIM. L. REV. 277, 277 (2004).
131
See Bruce R. Scott, The Political Economy of Capitalism 1 (Harv. Bus. Sch.
Working Paper No. 07-037, 2006),
https://www.hbs.edu/faculty/publication%20files/07-037.pdf.
132
See Ephrat Livni, Regulation Nation: What Industries Are Most Carefully
Overseen?, FINDLAW (Feb. 8, 2016),
https://blogs.findlaw.com/free_enterprise/2016/02/regulation-nation-whatindustries-are-most-carefully-overseen.html.
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In another sense, a rewards system for obeying the law would be
like giving every automobile driver a dollar every time they drove
without exceeding the speed limit. While at the same time, creating
an incentive system for drivers to report bad driving and speeding
fails to make reasonable sense in any subjective calculus. Beyond the
surface problem that rewarding behavior that an actor is already
obliged to perform, there is a problem of cost and funding. 133 It
seems unreasonable to affect certain treatment to others while
withholding it from others. There are questions like who would be
more deserving? How will resources be divided or shared? Thus, an
approach based purely on incentivizing good behavior likely seems
doomed to fail.
IV. INCENTIVE REGULATION APPLIED
A. California Public Utility Commission History
The CPUC was originally established as the Railroad
to regulate the powerful and influential railroad industries
California.134 Uniquely, the CPUC established its San Francisco
headquarters far away from Sacramento. 135
As diverse utility-related industries have grown in California,
Commission has regulated more utility providers.136 Due to its
large size137 and significant gas and oil deposits,138 several energy
giants developed in California.139 Notable energy giants in
California are Pacific Gas and Electric, 140 Southern California
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See, e.g., NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH, supra note 122, at
306-07.
134
MAX THELEN, PUBLIC UTILITIES ACT OF CALIFORNIA (Eugene R.
Hallett ed., 1st ed. 1912); see also CPUC History & Organizational Structure,
supra note 17.
135
See CPUC History & Organizational Structure, supra note 17.
136
CPUC History & Organizational Structure, CAL. PUB. UTIL. COMM’N,
https://www.cpuc.ca.gov/history/ (last visited Feb. 4, 2020); see also Utilities and
Industries, supra note 3.
137
Mark Otieno, What Is The Biggest State In The United States,
WORLDATLAS.COM, https://www.worldatlas.com/articles/what-is-the-biggeststate-in-the-us.html (last visited Feb. 4, 2020); Company profile, PACIFIC GAS
& ELECTRIC, https://www.pge.com/en_US/about-pge/companyinformation/profile/profile.page (last visited Feb. 4, 2020).
138
California State Profile and Energy Estimates, U.S. ENERGY INFO.
ADMIN., https://www.eia.gov/state/analysis.php?sid=CA (last visited Feb. 4,
2020).
139
PETER ASMUS, INTRODUCTION TO ENERGY IN CALIFORNIA (CALIFORNIA
NATURAL HISTORY GUIDES) (University of California Press, 1st ed. 2009).
140
Company profile, supra note 137.
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Edison,141 and San Diego Gas and Electric.142 As telephone
technology arose in the first half of the century, the Commission
began regulating the many regional telephone networks across the
state.143 Recently, ride-hailing services and automated vehicles have
have also become part of the Commission’s purview. 144 As new
technologies develop and present new challenges to the
Commission’s regulation of disparate industries, it may be time to
consider new rules for regulation of each of these industries.
B. Statutory Authority for Penalties and Fines
To reel in the powerful railroad industries, the California
Constitution established the Commission as a constitutional
agency.145 Section two of the California Constitution broadly states
states that “[s]ubject to statute and due process, the commission may
may establish its own procedures. Any commissioner as designated
designated by the commission may hold a hearing or investigation or
or issue an order subject to commission approval.”146
The California constitution has provided the Commission with
broad authority and power to regulate investor-owned utilities. 147 In
In addition to regulating investor-owned utilities, the Commission has
has used its administrative authority to establish its own rules and
procedures and to further define its authority. 148
Relevant to this article, the legislature has limited the
Commission's authority to issue monetary penalties in the Public
Utilities Code (PUC) §§ 701, 734, 2102, 2107, and 2108. 149
Perhaps the broadest among these statutes is PUC § 701, which
grants the Commission the power to establish any orders that are
“necessary and convenient” for the regulation of investor-owned
utilities.150 The Commission has broadly interpreted this section to
provide statutory authority to issue fines or injunctions. 151 Elsewhere,
the Commission has interpreted this section to give it more extreme
141
Our Service Territory, S. CAL. EDISON, https://www.sce.com/tl/aboutus/who-we-are/leadership/our-service-territory (last visited Feb. 4, 2020).
142
About Us, SAN DIEGO GAS & ELE., https://www.sdge.com/moreinformation/our-company/about-us (last visited Feb. 4, 2020).
143
Otieno, supra note 137.
144
Id.
145
THELEN, supra note 134, at 17-20.
146
CAL. CONST. art. XII, § 2.
147
THELEN, supra note 134.
148
Id.
149
CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE §§ 701, 734, 2102, 2107 (1951).
150
CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 701 (1951).
151
See Bay Area Rapid Transit Dist. Line, D. 19-01-022, 2019 WL 224252
(Cal. Pub. Util. Comm’n Jan. 10, 2019) [hereinafter D. 19-01-022].
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remedies, including divestiture.152 Where the legislature is silent,
the constitution grants the Commission the power to regulate a
utility in any justifiable way.153 Thus, when finding alternative
ways to regulate and broaden the scope of the Commission’s
regulation, PUC § 701 will probably provide statutory grounds.
Under PUC §§ 2107 and 2108, the Commission has statutory
authority to calculate fines.154 Recently, the statutory maximum
increased in PUC § 2107 from $50,000 to $100,000. 155 Despite
legislature altering PUC § 2107, it remains unclear whether the
$100,000 fine is a maximum or a benchmark for Commission
sanctions.156 Until the Commission fines a violator more than
$100,000, the meaning of the new amount will stay unknown.
1. Commission Distinction Between a Reparation and Fine
Before discussing any penalty by the Commission, it is helpful
distinguish a reparation from a fine. The primary agency
for issuing penalties is Decision (D.) 98-12-075.157 The decision
developed from Rulemaking (R.) 97-12-088 and resulted from
comments gathered from interested parties across the state.158
In the final decision, the Commission specifically interpreted
§ 734 to mean that “[t]he purpose [of a reparation] is to return
funds to the victim which were unlawfully collected by the public
utility. Accordingly, the statute requires that all reparation
amounts are paid to the victims.”159

152
See San Diego Gas and Electric Company’s Divestiture of Electric
Generating Assets, CAL. PUB. UTIL. COMM’N,
https://www.cpuc.ca.gov/Environment/info/esa/divest-sdge/index.html (last
accessed Apr. 14, 2020).
153
See Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 188 Cal. Rptr. 3d 374,
812 (2015).
154
The California Courts affirmed the Commission’s authority to impose
fines pursuant to § 2107. See, e.g., Pac. Bell Wireless, LLC v. Pub. Util.
Comm’n, 140 Cal. App. 4th 718 (2006).
155
As the statutory maximum has been shifted for the first time since 2011,
it remains uncertain whether this amount when compounded and applied to
multiple utility violations of compliance will have a significant effect in
deterring bad behavior.
156
See State v. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 906 P.2d 1209 (1995).
157
Standards of Conduct Governing Relationships Between Energy Util. and
Their Affiliates, D. 98-12-075, 1998 WL 995679 (Cal. Pub. Util. Comm’n Dec. 17,
1998) [hereinafter D. 98-12-075].
158
Standards of Conduct Governing Relationships Between Energy Util. and
Their Affiliates, R. 97-12-088, 1998 WL 995679 (Cal. Pub. Util. Comm’n Dec. 28,
1998).
159
D. 98-12-075, at *53.
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By this interpretation, reparation acts solely to repay victims
based on a calculated monetary assessment of the damages. 160 The
The purpose of reparation is not to deter any bad action, nor is it
deliberately meant to encourage the utility to correct its behavior.161
behavior.161 Reparation serves more like restitution, with deterrence
deterrence or a sense of punishment incidental to the monetary
amount.162
Thus, monetary reparations alone fail to account for nonmonetary harm committed by the utility. While the utility may pay
reparation to the injured party, this amount may not make any holistic
or systemic change to the utility’s behavior.
In D. 98-12-075, the Commission stated that “[t]he purpose of a
a fine is to go beyond [reparations] to the victim and to effectively
deter further violations by this perpetrator or others.”163 Where
“[e]ffective deterrence creates an incentive for public utilities to avoid
avoid violations.
Deterrence is particularly important against
violations which could result in public harm, and particularly against
against those where severe consequences could result.” 164
Thus, a fine presumably should be sufficient to encourage good
good behavior. Ideally, a fine should deter future bad action because
because the risk or previous fines disincentivize bad action. Thus,
fines may prevent bad actors from benefiting from their bad actions
actions and discourage other actors from misbehaving. 165
2. The Commission’s considerations for determining appropriate
fines
In D. 98-12-075, the Commission laid out five factors for
determining an appropriate fine: (1) the severity of the offense; (2)
the utility’s conduct; (3) the utility’s financial resources; (4) the
totality of the circumstances in furtherance of the public interest; and
(5) the role of precedent.166
These factors closely match subsequent California case law. The
California Supreme Court in People v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco
Company noted four factors for determining whether a fine is grossly

160

Id.
Id.
162
Randy Barnett, THE JUSTICE OF RESTITUTION, 25 AM. J. OF JURIS. 117, 117
(1980).
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disproportional to the gravity of the offense. 167 Those factors
include: (1) the defendant’s culpability; (2) the relationship
between the harm and the penalty; (3) the penalties imposed in
similar statutes; and (4) the defendant’s ability to pay. 168
a. Severity of the offense
This factor takes into consideration any economic harm,
of any statutory or Commission directive, and the number of
violations.169
For economic harm, the Commission considers the victims’
amount of expense and the public utility’s unlawful benefits,
that “the greater of these two amounts will be used in establishing
fine.”170 The Commission also may consider violations of
or compliance requirements.171 Although these do not harm
consumers, it harms the integrity of the regulatory processes. The
legislature requires all California public utilities to comply with
Commission directives.172 As noted in D. 98-12-075, “[s]uch
compliance is absolutely necessary to the proper functioning of
the regulatory process. For this reason, disregarding a statutory or
Commission directive, regardless of the effects on the public, will
be accorded a high level of severity.”173
The Commission also considers re-offenses in determining the
severity.174 The decision noted that “[a] series of temporally
distinct violations can suggest an on-going compliance deficiency
which the public utility should have addressed after the first
instance. Similarly, a widespread violation which affects a large
number of consumers is a more severe offense than one which is
limited in scope.”175 For a continuing violation, PUC § 2108
counts each day as a separate offense.176
Thus, when the Commission imposes fines on a noncompliant
utility, the fines may add up. At the beginning of 2019, Assembly
Bill 901 will set the upper statutory amount for fines at $100,000
167
People v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 37 Cal. 4th 707 (2005)
[hereinafter R.J. Reynolds]; see also United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321,
334 (1998) (where the Court used similar factors to determine that $350,000
for failure to report taking more than $10,000 cash out of the country was an
168
excessive
R.J.
fine).
Reynolds, 37 Cal. App. 4th at 728.
169
D. 98-12-075, at *54.
170
Id.
171
Id.
172
See, e.g., CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 702 (1951).
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D. 98-12-075, at *55-56.
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Id. at *54.
175
D. 98-12-075, at 56.
176
CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 2108 (1951).

79

80

Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary

40-1

while leaving the lower statutory amount at $500.177 Because the
legislature revised the statutory amount for the first time since 2011,
2011, it remains uncertain whether the change will significantly deter
deter bad behavior.178
b. The conduct of the utility before, during, and after the offense
The conduct factor considers the utility’s culpability and its
compliance with applicable laws, regulations, and Commission
directives.179 The Commission considers prudent practice, which
requires that all public utilities take reasonable steps to ensure
compliance with Commission directives. 180 Reasonable steps include
include the utility becoming familiar with applicable laws and
regulations, and most critically, regularly reviewing its operations to
to ensure full compliance.181 In evaluating the utility’s compliance
compliance efforts, the Commission considers its past compliance
with Commission directives.182
In D. 98-12-075, the Commission considered the utility’s actions
to detect a violation.183 This includes diligently monitoring their
activities “[w]here utilities have for whatever reason failed to meet
this standard, the Commission will continue to hold the utility
responsible for its actions. Deliberate, as opposed to inadvertent
wrong-doing, will be considered an aggravating factor.” 184
The Commission considered a public utility’s steps to promptly
and cooperatively report and correct violations. 185 When a public
utility is aware of a violation, the Commission expects the public
utility to promptly bring it to the attention of the Commission.186 The
definition of “prompt” will vary based on the nature of the
violation.187 Thus, the Commission may need to oversee each
industry’s safety requirements in addition to its industry-specific
regulations.188

177
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See supra note 155 and accompanying text.
179
D. 98-12-075, at *57.
180
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c. The financial resources of the utility
The financial resources factor considers the financial
the public utility.189 The Commission must adjust the utility’s
deter misconduct, without excessively penalizing it, based on its
financial resources.190
In D. 15-04-024, the Commission evaluated the market value
Pacific Gas and Electric (PG&E) when calculating an appropriate
penalty amount.191
The Commission considered various
factors, including company share price, equity, and investor
expectation.192
The Commission also considered relevant
to determine whether “PG&E should be able to pay a penalty of
magnitude without harming ratepayers or its ability raise the
needed for revenue-producing investments required to provide
adequate and safe service.”193
However, this analysis may be problematic when extreme
punishment of the utility might have far-reaching consequences
consumers.194 A financially troubled utility may be incapable of
paying the Commission’s fine, causing it to declare bankruptcy. 195
There must be a balance between an adequate fine that would
deter a utility’s misconduct, and a fine that would force a utility to
declare bankruptcy. If a fine is too small, it would equate to
payment for wrongdoing, or a license for violation. Alternatively,
if a fine is too excessive, it could push the utility towards
bankruptcy and harm the utility’s public users who the regulator
seeks to protect.
d. The totality of the circumstances in furtherance of the public
interest
This factor takes into consideration facts that may mitigate or
exacerbate the degree of wrongdoing.196 This includes setting a
fine at a level that effectively deters further unlawful conduct by
the regulated utility and requiring that the Commission
specifically tailor the package of sanctions, including any fine, to
189

D. 98-12-075, at *50.
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191
Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., D. 15-04-024, 2015 WL 4648065, at *62 (Cal.
Pub. Util. Comm’n July 23, 2015) [hereinafter D. 15-04-024].
192
Id. at *62-66.
193
Id. at *70.
194
Dale Kasler, Tony Bizjak, Alexei Koseff, & Sophia Bollag, PG&E
plans to file bankruptcy. Will the utility go under? We’ve got some answers,
SACRAMENTO BEE (Jan. 14, 2019),
https://www.sacbee.com/news/business/article224188410.html.
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the unique facts of the case.197 The Commission reviews facts that
tend to mitigate the degree of wrongdoing as well as any facts which
exacerbate the wrongdoing. In all cases, the harm is evaluated from
the perspective of the public interest.198
In D. 15-04-024, the Commission evaluated “PG&E’s statutory
statutory obligation to provide safe and reliable gas service, the
pervasive nature of PG&E’s recordkeeping shortfalls, the impact of
of the San Bruno explosion on its residents, and the Commission’s
Commission’s and the public interest in ensuring safe and reliable
natural gas service.”199
Thus, in assessing this factor the Commission evaluates the effect
effect that the fine will have on ratepayers and consumers who use the
use the public utility.200 Corollary to the previous factor, this requires
requires the Commission to be mindful that any decrease in the
utility’s ability to provide reliable service will ultimately be of greater
detriment to the public.201
Furthermore, legislation, and the
Commission’s rules and policies are mindful of the economic effect
of fines to the ratepayers and public consumers who use the utility.202
There is a network of cost-recovery procedures and allowances that
affect the publicly owned utility’s ability to pass fines off as costs to
ratepayers as opposed to shareholders. 203
e. The role of precedent
This factor takes into consideration the proposed outcome with
“previously issued decisions which involve the most reasonably
comparable factual circumstances and explain any substantial
differences in outcome.”204 Yet, the Commission adjudicates a wide
range of cases with sanctions, many cases of first impression, so the
outcomes rarely comparable. 205
In D. 15-04-024, the Commission struggled to find any relevant
comparison to prior its decisions to determine the appropriate
penalties for a gas pipeline explosion.206 Furthermore, the diversity
of regulated industries by the Commission presents additional
problems for finding adequate comparisons between pending cases
197
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Id.
199
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200
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and prior decisions. As described above, the Commission
regulates industries ranging from ride-sharing services like Lyft
and Uber to electric and gas utility companies.207 It may be
difficult to find even a slightly comparable match of precedential
decisions between any two industries. While for some industries
there may be a large amount of precedential cases, for others there
may be no prior precedent for reference or comparison.
3. Assessing the D. 98-12-075 Framework and Potential for
Development
More than a decade since the Commission voted on R. 98-01009,208 the problems facing the Commission have changed.
many goals were considered theoretical and infeasible at the time,
now advances in technology, reporting, and resources can further
ensure industry compliance. 209 At the same time, with the
widening of the socioeconomic gaps in San Francisco,210 where
the Commission is headquartered, 211 immense competition for
hiring poses unique personnel and hiring challenges. 212
Incidentally, while technology increases the regulator’s ability
and tools to efficiently monitor industry action, the drivers of that
technology make it increasingly difficult for the Commission to
find operators with the ability to effectively apply those tools.213
With the reintroduction of agency decentralization and
Commission offices stationed in different parts of the state, the
Commission is seeking ways to broaden its access to different
207

See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
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209
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211
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industries.214 Beyond the geographic and socioeconomic confines an
expensive metropolitan area, the Commission now has the flexibility
to establish offices elsewhere.215 While decentralization is still in its
early stages, there is potential this early expansion can facilitate
greater change in how the Commission regulates and fines industries
to enforce compliance.216
V. CONCLUSION
With the pervasiveness of electricity217 and the increased impetus
by states for either cheaper or cleaner energy production,218 the role
of the public utility commission should remain prominent for the
foreseeable future. While diverse states may seek to advance varying
energy projects based on the original ratemaking imperatives of most
public utility commissions, much of future regulations will probably
concern how utilities arrive at fair rates. While at times this may
include misbehavior, the respective public utility commission must be
ready to react and respond to these bad actions. At the same time,
because of the size and scope of regulated industries, public utility
commissions must be willing to respond to good behavior. Although
there may be significant challenges ahead, many of these state
commissions are presented with enormous statutory authority and
tools for regulation.219 Thus, there remains significant confidence in
the hope that those in charge of regulation have the ability to regulate
well. It only remains for them to wisely and aptly operate those tools.
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